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Abstract. The aim of this paper is two-fold: to engage the contemporary discussion 
about the nature of relations between different scientific disciplines, as well as to dis-
entangle the concept of integration of sciences from superstructures of rival proposals. 
The authors start with a critical analysis of the Polish contribution to the discussion 
about the nature of integration of sciences from the second half of the XXth century. 
Such a step is followed by elaborating a refined account of integration and by disentan-
gling the concept of integration from superstructures of rival proposals – unification 
and interdisciplinarity. On the grounds of such a refined account the authors deliver 
a reconstruction of a successful scientific integration. In doing this they introduce the 
idea of connective knowledge as generated by the methodology of humanities. After 
reconstructing the successful integration trial, in the concluding remarks their account 
of integration is specified and summarized.
Keywords: methodology of humanities, integration, unification, interdisciplinarity, model 
of primitive magic syncretism, Poznań Methodological School.
1. Introductory remarks: integration of sciences  
as a challenge for methodological research
Addressing the question of how to theoretically grasp the relations between 
different scientific disciplines has a long tradition in the systematic reflection on 
science across the academia. Among the most prominent approaches that were 
formulated and advocated for over the years are the following three: unification 
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approach [cf. Kitcher, 1981; Petkow, 2015], interdisciplinarity approach [cf. 
Klein, 1990, 2010; Lattuca, 2001] and integration approach [cf. Bechtel, 1986a; 
Mitchell, Dietrich, 2006; Gerson, 2013]. The peculiarity of the discussions that 
took place in the second half of the XX century in Poland was the special focus 
on the third approach, namely the integration of sciences. Undoubtedly, merits 
for thorough study of integration of sciences go to scientific journals such as 
Methodological Studies (pol. Studia Metodologiczne), Problems of Science of 
Science Quarterly (pol. Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa) and Philosophical Studies 
(pol. Studia Filozoficzne), which created institutional conditions for exchange 
of scientific information, coordination of research and consultation of results. 
Among questions that were attempted to address during this discussion the 
three following are of special importance to our further investigations:
• definition of integration; 
• levels of integration;
• structure of integration.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will sketch the 
Polish contribution to the discussion about the definition, levels and structure 
of integration of sciences, as well as will offer our refined account of integration. 
This will be followed by an attempt to disentangle the concept of integration 
of sciences from superstructures of rival proposals, namely that of unification 
and interdisciplinarity (section 3). On the grounds of our refined account on 
integration we will deliver a reconstruction of a successful scientific integration 
trial. In doing this we will introduce the idea of connective knowledge as gener-
ated by the methodology of humanities (section 4). Finally, in the concluding 
remarks we will specify and summarize our account on integration of sciences.
2. Underlabouring for clarification of the idea of integration 
2.1. Problems with definition of integration
As regards the first question – definition of integration, during this dis-
cussion it was recognized that the lack of commonly accepted definition of 
integration was due to the fact that the very term ‘integration’ has been sys-
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tematically equipped with many different meanings [Lazari-Pawłowska, 1975, 
p. 32]. To tackle with such a polysemy, some initial conceptual distinctions 
and partial findings were offered:
“there are many misunderstandings in the understanding integration as such. First 
of all, it should be underlined that processes of bringing together various disciplines 
need not be related to their merging (pol. scalanie) that is gradual disappearance of 
some of them; on the contrary – by participating in integration processes particular 
branches of research can gain conditions for a fuller development” [Topolski, 1965, 
p. 6; emphasis added; authors’ translation];
“Let us start with a question – what the integration of science is. This term does not 
mean merging various disciplines but rather aiming at connecting (pol. wiązanie) 
them, while keeping their autonomy” [Maisel, 1973, p. 80; emphasis added; authors’ 
translation];
“Organic integration versus external integration. The second element of the (…) op-
position can be characterised relatively easily. External, „mechanical” integration, 
i.e. – to use a somewhat humorous name – „bookbinder” integration takes place 
when one juxtaposes (pol. zestawiać ze sobą) mechanically, for instance in the frame 
of a monograph, research results from various disciplines concerning – prima facie – 
the same subject-matter” [Kmita, 1975, pp. 8-9; emphasis added; authors’ translation].
The above-mentioned quotes allow us to identify keywords which we will 
use to explicate the meaning of the term ‘integration’:
• juxtaposition (pol. zestawienie);
• connection (pol. powiązanie);
• merging (pol. scalanie). 
In the light of the foregoing clarifications, integration is about connecting 
findings of various scientific disciplines; it is not only a juxtaposition and it 
is not yet a merger. Thus, in the first specification integration is neither about 
juxtaposition nor about merging. It is more than juxtaposition but less than 
merging. In this sense these discussions and their partial conclusions and 
suggestions remain valid and maybe they are even more valid today than 
then. Let us take the following example of clarification of integration from 
more recent literature: 
“Integration thus means more than simple juxtaposition of efforts in the same location, 
and more than relationships that consist solely of market relations. Rather, it includes 
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coordinated efforts to pose and solve new research problems that can redefine specialty 
boundaries. (…) Integration of specialties is almost never complete, in the sense of 
a full epistemic and organizational merger of two specialties. Instead, both epistemic 
and organizational integration are partial; that is, lines of research in two different 
specialties conduct their work using common concerns, approaches, or styles, without 
merging or abandoning their other concerns” [Gerson, 2013, p. 516; emphasis added].
Given the above findings, in the first place one should differentiate be-
tween integration and juxtaposition. Even though we do not yet have at our 
disposal a commonly accepted definition of integration, we do have some 
baseline common vocabulary to discuss this notion and its cognates, such as 
interdisciplinarity or multidisciplinarity [Holbrook, 2013, p. 1866]. By refer-
ring to this vocabulary we can state that there is a minor discord among the 
commentators involved regarding the latter of the two concepts. Multidisci-
plinarity is in fact a juxtaposition of findings from two or more disciplines 
regarding a given problem [e.g. Miller, 1982; Richards, 1996; Klein, 2010]. 
A multidisciplinary juxtaposition is not about an integrative connection, thus 
some slightly ironic names, such as ‘bookbinder integration’ or ‘mechanical 
integration’ appear. They are meant to point out that in fact it is not integra-
tion, or else that it is some pseudo-integration. Therefore, multidisciplinarity 
as such is not the subject of our investigations, although we do refer to it 
while contrasting multidisciplinarity, unification and integration in terms of 
discipline-specific world-views.
The issue looks completely different in the case of interdisciplinarity: 
there are clear-cut tendencies “to glue” interdisciplinarity to integration and 
that interdisciplinarity presupposes or implies integration. Such tendencies 
are predominant and widespread to the point that, as J. Britt Holbrook put 
it, “to question whether ID [interdisciplinarity] involves integration is almost 
heretical” [Holbrook, 2013, p. 1877]. In the following sections we will try to 
show that it can be legitimately questioned. It should first be noted that scopes 
of terms ‘interdisciplinarity’ and ‘integration’ intersect in a non-empty way. 
Another issue is to disentangle relations between the concepts of integration 
and unification, because contemporary discussions about integration of sci-
ences are still burdened with unificatory intentions. It can be illustrated by 
interchangeable use of terms ‘integration’ and ‘unification’ or by excessive use 
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of the expression ‘integration or unification’ [e.g. Grantham, 2004; Kaplan, 
2017; Driscoll, 2018].
1.2. Difficulties with levels of integration
As regards the second question – the levels of integration, the main em-
phasis in the discussion that took place in Poland in the second half of the 
XXth century was put on distinguishing three levels of integration:
• epistemic-methodological – that relates to possible mutual impact of at 
least two different disciplinary systems of knowledge;
• practical-institutional – that relates to possible interaction of at least two 
types of specialists or groups of specialists with different disciplinary 
background;
• ideational – that relates to possible interplay between at least two types 
of so-called social methodological consciousness that consists, among 
others, in different discipline-specific world-views [Łojewska, 1976, 
pp. 57-61].
Such a proposal finds support in a growing number of works from recent 
philosophical and methodological literature on integration of sciences. Let 
us recall here only one case that make use of the concept of levels of analysis. 
In the first the concept in question has been already clearly explicated and 
systematically utilized [Mitchell et al., 1997, pp. 103-125; Mitchell, 2009]. Ac-
cording to this proposal, there is no basic level of analysis to which other can 
be reduced. However, it does not imply that all levels are isolated from one 
another. The question is rather how to carefully identify connections between 
them, remembering at the same time not to analytically confuse them.
Let us now go back to the first level of integration – the epistemic one. It 
relates to possible mutual impact of at least two different disciplinary systems 
of knowledge. During the discussion in Poland the issue of exploratory po-
tential carried by integration trials was signaled. Let us illustrate this issue by 
recalling selected quotations from the discussion:
“We mean here the form of integration of science, which is about(…) connecting (and 
not merely mechanically juxtaposing) results of research from various disciplines, ex-
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ceeding however beyond the task of suggesting ideas” [Topolski, 1965, pp. 7-8; emphasis 
added; authors’ translation];
“There is an expectation that all humanities (…) should take into account synchronic 
connections between particular forms of social consciousness (…) It therefore imposes 
(…) the need to integrate research on the methodological basis which respects – what 
is especially worth underlining – a relative autonomy of each of the disciplines” [Kmita, 
1973a, pp. 79-80; emphasis added; authors’ translation].
These remarks are supported by contemporary scholars working on the 
idea of integration of sciences. Let us take the following example of clarifica-
tion of the exploratory potential of integration from the literature:
“the linkage between the fields was discovered only after a critical reconceptualiza-
tion occurred in each field separately (…) The integration of research (…) involved 
identifying relationships between entities that had been studied independently that 
allowed researchers in each field to learn new information about the entities that were 
of primary interest to them” [Bechtel, 1986a, pp. 45-46; emphasis added].
In a sense this discussions and their partial conclusions and suggestions 
remain valid and maybe they are even more valid today than then. In recent 
discussions it is indicated that integration can have an explanatory goal al-
though it is not a necessary condition. Its heuristic goal is more and more often 
underlined, i.e. that integration in practice is not directly oriented towards 
providing explanations [Grantham, 2004, p. 144]. Integration is often guided 
by exploratory questions, for instance of ‘what if ’ type, which do not set a nar-
rowly determined scope of research and therefore play an important integrat-
ing function. Exploratory questions are open-ended and they tend to sustain 
and help integrate research activities. Integration in the exploratory use “can 
produce novel insights into […] phenomena, stimulate new fields of research, 
and generally reconfigure expectations of scientific practice” [O’Malley, Soyer, 
2012, p. 58]. Novel insights into research phenomena can take the shape of 
answers to novel questions, models, hypotheses or new research methods. 
It has to be remembered though that integration is not a goal of science per 
se. Quest for integrated research perspective “can be a useful heuristic, but it 
should be viewed as a heuristic, not as the aim of science” [Waters, 2017, p. 104, 
emphasis in original]. Heuristic quest for novel insights manifests especially 
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in affecting the shape of theoretical models and the conceptualization of an 
object of research. In this respect successive integration “might lead to the 
transformation, or reshaping, of one model or conceptualization of the system 
of interest by another” [Plutynski, 2013, p. 470; emphasis added]. Thus a suc-
cessful integration, when considered on the level of the system of scientific 
knowledge, may provide new data, new or refined modeling strategies, as well 
as new or refined conceptualizations of an object of research. It means that 
integration carries some exploratory potential. 
This is how we arrived at the second level of integration – practical-
institutional It relates to possible interaction of at least two types of specialists 
or groups of specialists with different disciplinary background. During the 
discussion in Poland the question of social and institutional arrangements, as 
distinct from theoretical and methodological conditions, that make possible 
integration of two (or more) kinds of research was raised [Kmita, 1975, p. 8]. 
Let us illustrate this issue by recalling selected quotations from the discussion:
“Institutional integration is an important aspect of integrating scientific research because 
cooperation of large teams of specialists requires such an organizational structure of 
research units which would stimulate research ventures and secure the process of 
their realization” [Łojewska, 1976, p. 57-58; emphasis added; authors’ translation];
“integration of scientific research from the organizational side implies that researchers 
from various specialties take up joint research. This way of understanding integration 
can be described simply as cooperation which can take the form of a) a team research 
using the same (or similar) method for various problems b) a multi-faceted investi-
gations of one problem using different ways or c) a joint research in which different 
approaches intersect” [Maisel, 1973, p. 81; emphasis added; authors’ translation];
“integration of sciences is related to the most important cognitive, methodological 
and organizational tasks of science. In this last domain one should equally strictly 
differentiate between the autonomy of cognitive processes and organizational matters 
as well as properly defined practical postulates” [Czartoryski, 1967, p. 13; emphasis 
added; authors’ translation].
Distinguishing this level may be considered hardly insightful and the 
sociology of science or studies on technology and science address this ques-
tion in a detailed way. But still, investigating it in the context of integration of 
sciences and focusing on relations to other levels may provide new insights. 
There are some works from the philosophical and sociological literature that 
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clearly distinguish this level of integration from the epistemic one. Accord-
ing to Elihu M. Gerson, there are two kinds of integration – epistemic and 
organizational. The latter “consists of the ways that the work of laboratories, 
associations, universities, sponsors, and other organizations mesh and change 
in forming the system of research institutions” [Gerson, 2013, p. 515]. As there 
are no simple and clear-cut relationship between these two kinds of integra-
tion, what is needed is to identify various intersection in which the epistemic 
integration interacts with the organizational one. What is more, as Wim J. 
van der Steen put it, the question is not only about the intersection of the 
epistemic and practical kinds of integration. According to him, one has to be 
aware that materialization of only the institutional conditions (e.g. exchange, 
cooperation, publications) without fulfilling the theoretical-methodological 
ones is not enough for the successful integration. To avoid the accusation of 
pseudo-integration both kinds of conditions have to be met [van der Steen, 
1993b, p. 349].
As it has been already stated, distinguishing the epistemic and practical 
levels of analysis of integration of science is quite common in recent literature. 
What distinguishes, however, the discussion about integration that took place 
in Poland in the second half of the XXth century was the identification of the 
third level of analysis of integration. This level relates to possible interplay be-
tween at least two kinds of social methodological consciousness that consists, 
among others, in different discipline-specific world-views. Let us begin the 
investigation into this level of analysis by shortly clarifying the idea of meth-
odological consciousness. This idea was of major importance to the Poznań 
Methodological School1. As Jerzy Topolski addressed the question to the 
audience of practicing historians: “[m]ethodological principles, together with 
the ideal of science and the view of the world and Man (…) constitute what is 
called methodological consciousness” [Topolski, 1985, p. 149]. Methodological 
1 The Poznań Methodological School is an inherent part of the Polish (and not only) 
intellectual landscape. It was one of the more unique and creative philosophic-methodological 
Denkkollektiv in the post-war Europe. It was founded in the mid-60s of the XX century by such 
scholars as Jerzy Topolski (1928-1998), Jerzy Kmita (1931-2012) and Leszek Nowak (1943-
2009). For a detailed discussion about the meta-methodological characteristics of the Poznań 
Methodological School, see: [Boruszewski, Nowak-Posadzy, 2017].
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consciousness contains, apart from the cognitive norms and methodologi-
cal directives, also the researcher’s world-view (Weltanschauung). All these 
components are objects of methodological reconstruction. The structure of 
researchers’ methodological consciousness consists of five major components:
• cognitive norms;
• methodological directives;
• meta-scientific attitudes concerning aim of scientific cognition;
• world-view (Weltanschauung); 
• vision of Man.
This was an interesting attempt to conceptualize the third level of integra-
tion in terms of methodological consciousness with special focus on world-
view as carried by different disciplines (specialties) engaging the integration 
trials. As the concept of world-view is not new in discussions from the field 
of philosophy of science [cf. Mormann, 2018; Rouse, 2015; Aerts, Van Belle, 
van der Veken, 1999; Aerts, Apostel, De Moor, Hellemans, Maex, Van Belle, 
Van der Veken, 1994; Cobern, 1991], let us now explicate its meaning and 
present the way in which it was utilized in the discussion about integration. 
By the world-view it was meant a system of beliefs which determines both (i) 
a set of superior positive values (i.e. ultimate values that the person espouses) 
and (ii) types of connections between those superior positive values and 
practical values which are either means to achieve those superior positive 
values, or to prevent their achievement, or are neutral with respect to their 
achievement [Kmita, 1991, p. 168; Kmita, 1979, p. 299]. From this perspective 
a science is not only one of the most important factors shaping the world-view 
belief system, but also its own internal development and research activities 
are in a sense influenced by a world-view [Łojewska, 1986, p. 211]. This 
remarks allow us to differentiate respectively between scientific world-view 
(pol. światopogląd naukowy) and world-view in science (pol. światopogląd 
w nauce). Regarding the former, a world-view is scientific when (i) a scientific 
knowledge determines ways of materializing the superior positive values and 
(ii) a scientific knowledge guarantees the possibility of doing this [Kmita, 
1979, p. 301].
For the purpose of the article we will focus here only on the very concept 
of world-view in science which needs, however, some further clarification. 
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As we investigate here the type of world-views that may interplay in integra-
tion trials we have to differentiate between: (i) a world-view behind a science 
that is an presupposed by science (or a given discipline) a general image of the 
world and (ii) a scientist’s world-view which can be attributed to a particular 
researcher. The difference between these two is not irrelevant: “in the first case 
it is about such a world-view which will have methodological and theoretical 
implications and will thus influence the methods applied and conclusions 
formulated; in the second case, there can be world-views which do not have 
the above-mentioned implications and therefore cannot be treated as compo-
nents of the general world-view accepted by science” [Łojewska, 1986, p. 216]. 
There appear the question of the relation of this level to the epistemic one. It 
has to be carefully stated that there seems to be no direct and unambiguous 
connection between results of scientific research and explicitly accepted or 
implicitly respected system of world-view beliefs [Ibidem, p. 212]. 
It was recognized in the discussion in question that the important prob-
lem in the disciplinary division of labour does not stem from any excessive 
specialization occurring in sciences, but rather from an insufficient degree of 
methodological (self)consciousness [Ziembiński, 1966, p. 3; Kula, 1963, pp. 80-
81]. A general issue hardly any participants of the debate in Poland contested 
was that if one take integration seriously, then the dissemination of “a meth-
odological culture” across disciplines was needed for any successful integration 
trial [Kmita, 1975; Kmita, 1973a; Kmita, 1973b; Lazari-Pawłowska, 1967, p. 34; 
Łojewska, 1976; Łubnicki, 1967, p. 20]. Some discrepancies appeared in the 
debate when it comes to the question of consequences of the interplay between 
two kinds of methodological consciousness behind disciplines engaged in the 
integration trial to the discipline-specific world-views. Once more, let us il-
lustrate this issue by recalling selected quotations from the discussion:
“Investigating the domain of culture as constituted by the science via methodology 
plays a particularly important role in shaping a coherent, rational world-view (…), sci-
entific image of the world.” [Kmita; 1973a, p. 75; emphasis added; authors’ translation]; 
“The increase of mutual connections between particular disciplines (…) proves useful 
for the development of science in at least two aspects. First of all, it can enrich research 
methods of particular sciences and secondly, it can increase the scope of questions 
formulated within a given science via inspiring uses of results of one science for others 
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(…) Such cooperation aims at enriching particular sciences rather than blur differences 
between them.” [Topolski; 1965, p. 3; emphasis added; authors’ translation];
“When specialization was not so advanced, theories used to be very general and not 
very precise. However, they provided a coherent world-view. Today a mosaic of thou-
sands of specialist news cannot always be formed into one coherent world-view which 
determines our specific place in the world and in the society, as well as indicates us 
global goals in life. The longing for all-encompassing cognition constitutes one of ad-
ditional causes for quandaries one would like to eliminate by integrating sciences.” 
[Koj, 1975, p. 82; emphasis added; authors’ translation].
On the grounds of the above suggestions and some more recent findings 
in the following table we illustrate the differences between three philosophical 
agendas in terms of consequences of the interplay of different specialties to 
the discipline-specific world-view: 
Table 1: Integration and discipline-specific world views.
Philosophical agenda Kind of relation between research results





This table needs some comments. The presupposition is that each scientific 
discipline has its own specific world-view [Miller, 1982; Newell, Green, 1982]. 
Depending on the philosophical agenda taken and respective kind of rela-
tion between interplaying specialties, one can draw at least three possibilities 
regarding consequences to the discipline-specific world-views. Please notice 
that we are talking here about consequences and not aims. It is so because 
discipline-specific world-views are to a large degree rather of tacit (or implicit) 
nature. Let us now clarify these possibilities:
• multidisciplinary juxtaposing of research findings from at least two 
specialties tends to be accompanied by the inviolability of initial dis-
cipline-specific world-views of contributing specialties; is means that 
multidisciplinary trial is acknowledged to leave initial discipline-specific 
world-views invariant (intact);
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Such a view is supported by some recent works which argue that “multidis-
ciplinary research involves low levels of collaboration, does not challenge the 
structure or functioning of academic communities or hierarchies and does 
not lead to any changes in the worldviews of the researchers themselves” [Lyall, 
Bruce, Tait, Meagher 2011, p. 13; emphasis added];
• unificatory merging of research findings from at least two specialties 
tends to be accompanied by the reconciliation of initial discipline-
specific world-views of contributing specialties; it means that unificatory 
trial is acknowledged to arrive at all-encompassing world-view;
However, a difficulty arises for an unification trial to be successful once world-
views behind interacting disciplines are radically different (fully incomparable 
or uninterpretable). As Donald G. Richards put it, “[s]ynthesis, or interdis-
ciplinary integration [in its strong or literal sense] as it is often otherwise 
expressed, may in some contexts be infeasible due to irreconcilable differences 
in epistemological, or value, terms among the world-views of the contribut-
ing disciplines, or the variants of these disciplines” [Richards, 1996, p. 126; 
emphasis added]. In the situation where “the likelihood of a reconciliation 
of these divergent world-views is remote, or impossible, those who place 
primary importance on achieving an integrated view of things will be forced 
into adopting one of these fundamental perspectives and excluding the others” 
[Richards, 1996, p. 123].
• integrative connecting of research findings from at least two specialties 
tends to be accompanied by the ideal of enrichment of initial discipline-
specific world-views of contributing specialties; it means that integrative 
trial is acknowledged to exceed (transcend), but not beyond necessity, the 
narrow scope of discipline-specific world-views of contributing specialties.
Such a view is supported by some recent works which argue that “[i]t is 
clear, then, that the two can yield a “synthesis” only in a loose [a weak, or 
instrumental], “enriched-view-of the-world” sense. There would seem to be 
unbreachable epistemological barriers preventing genuine integration in such 
cases. This does not, however, necessarily de-legitimize this type of interdisci-
plinary cooperation. An enriched view of the world, or of a particular issue, is 
a noble academic objective” [Richards, 1996, p. 122; emphasis added]. In other 
words, in integration trials there is always a discipline-specific world-view for 
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which some ‘parts’ of other discipline-specific world-view are incomparable 
or uninterpretable [Kmita, 2000, p. 202]. However, it does not exclude the 
possibility of achieving an enriched world-view; only the possibility of both 
full reconciliation and invariance of different world-views are here denied. 
Before we go to the preliminary analysis of the problem of the structure 
of integration, two additional remarks have to be made. Firstly, apart from the 
main question of the consequences of the interaction of different specialties 
to the discipline-specific world-views, there arises similar problem whether 
discipline-specific world-views behind interacting specialties may counteract 
successful trials. This question has been already addressed within the philo-
sophical literature. It is sufficient here to state, as Lele and Norgaard recently put 
it, that: “[t]he first kind of (…) barrier (difference in values) is neither directly 
discernible nor easily separated from the second (difference in theories, models, 
or worldviews)” [Lele, Norgaard, 2005, p. 968]. Our second remark concerns 
the conspicuous trend toward entanglement of the concept of integration 
in nostalgic pretense to reconciliation of mutually incoherent disciplinary 
insights [Newell, Green, 1982] or to re-integration of social sciences which in 
XIX century were united [Szell, Shujiro, 1993]. Firstly, a successful integration 
trial does not require complete inclusiveness, sometimes it even requires some 
exclusiveness and it does not assume a lasting state of unity – it can be merely 
tentative, contingent, occasionally durable and longer-term it can be undurable. 
Secondly, a successful integration does not require a complete convergence of 
respective world-views behind the specialized disciplines engaged in integra-
tion trial. In other words, due to the fact that the discipline-specific world-
views are at best only partially comparable or interpretable, what is sufficient 
for integration is only to transcend the narrow scope of discipline-specific 
world-views to achieve a richness of insight without longing for reconciliation.
1.3. Exposition of the structure of integration
As regards the third basic question – the structure of integration, what is 
important here is the problem of property attributed to the relation of inte-
gration. In contemporary discussions concerning the integration of sciences 
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it is strongly emphasized that integrating exhibits the mutual nature which 
suggests that the relation of integration is a symmetric one. As it has been 
already pointed out, such a mutuality is equally discernible on the epistemic 
level of integration where connecting research findings from various disci-
plines is followed by reciprocal impact, as well as on the ideational level where 
enriching of discipline-specific world-views encompasses each side engaged in 
integration trial. Let us now take the following examples from recent literature 
to support the claim that the relation of integration in symmetric:
“Partial integration among specialties is embodied in a system of alliances that span 
multiple specialties. Partial integration depends on several different kinds of stable 
coordinative arrangements that join specialties without reducing their epistemic 
integrity. These include, for example, the use of model data systems; conventions for 
theorizing and for collecting, analyzing, and visualizing data; and the encumbering 
of one line of work by another as an ‘‘obligatory point of passage’’ or, more simply, 
obligation (…) Such coordinative arrangements are integrative in the sense that two or 
more lines of work become mutually dependent upon one another for success” [Gerson, 
2013, p. 518; emphasis added];
“In many cases, the commitments (‘‘background assumptions’’) of one of the integrating 
lines do not coincide with those of the other, and this typically necessitates mutual adjust-
ments in order to make the intersection work effectively” [Ibidem, p. 516; emphasis added].
In light of the above considerations, the property of symmetry, suggested by 
usage of the expressions ‘mutually dependent’ and ‘mutual adjustments’, can be 
legitimately attributed to the relation of integration. Therefore we conceptualize 
integration as a mutual and not one-sided relation between at least two parts. 
However, during the discussion that took place in Poland in the second half 
of the XX century and was continued in the beginnings of XXI century the 
question of the symmetric nature of the relation of integration was not explic-
itly thematized and it was rather taken as a default. The claim that the relation 
of integration is a symmetric one means that if x is being integrated with y, 
then y is being integrated with x. We thus have two integrated sides. However, 
this question generates a basic problem whether the property of symmetry can 
be secured when the relation of integration is conceptualized as a binary rela-
tion. In classical discussions about this issue, when the problem of reduction 
was addressed, integrating was considered as such a binary relation but one of 
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the disciplines involved in the integration trial was given a privileged status. 
Therefore one of the sides of integration provided means for actually carrying 
out the integration. This, however, implies that in the last instance the relation 
in question is not mutual but one-sided. When integration is conceptualized 
as a binary relation, the property of symmetry is significantly violated: x is be-
ing integrated with y, but by means supplied by either x or y. Moreover, as the 
second quotation suggests, the question occurs what is the basis for such a mu-
tual adjustment. Thus two issues need to be distinguished and discussed here:
• the question of the substantial parts being integrated: what is being 
integrated?
• the question of what facilitates the integration: how is it integrated, by 
means of what is it integrated?
Let us now turn to the Poznań Methodological School, whose some leading 
members (Jerzy Topolski, Jerzy Kmita, Anna Pałubicka) were actively engaged 
in the discussion about integration. The numerous works by this School can be 
informally classified into two types: “the canonical” (or “core”)2 ones that are the 
results of systematic research and “the apocryphal” (or “peripheral”) ones that are 
rather the by-products of many intellectual exchanges. Given such a distinction, 
the contributions of the members of the Poznań Methodological School to the 
discussion about the idea of the integration of sciences should be labelled as “the 
apocryphal” ones. There are at least two successful cases when this “peripheral” 
idea was put into research practice: the project by Jerzy Topolski to integrate 
economic history and economic theory [Topolski, 1964, 1991, 2009] and the 
project of integration of archeology and ethnology [Pałubicka, 1979; Kowalski 
1997]. In the 80. and 90. of the XX century the discussion about integration of 
sciences in Poland weakened and the interest in applicatory works diminished. 
However, the idea of integration reappeared in the Poznanian circle in the 
beginning of XXI century under the label of “integrated humanities.” We will 
go back to the issue of successful integration of archeology and ethnology 
via methodology of humanities in one of the following sections of this paper.
2 By the “canonical” works we mean the works of Jerzy Topolski on methodology of his-
tory and theory of non-source-based historical knowledge [Topolski, 1976], Leszek Nowak on 
the idealizational theory of science [Nowak, 1980] and Jerzy Kmita on historical epistemology 
[Kmita, 1988] and socio-regulative theory of culture [Kmita, 1996].
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It was the Poznań Methodological School that provided some suggestions 
and partial answers useful in addressing in more detail the two questions 
enumerated above. The members of this School were aware that there has 
to be some basis for the mutual adjustment in integration trials and thus 
focused mostly on the second question. The answer they provide to the ques-
tion of how at least two disciplines are integrated and by means of what, is 
that methodology of science can play a facilitating role in such a trial. This is 
how the discipline of general methodology of sciences entered the scheme of 
integration. Let us illustrate this issue by recalling selected quotations from 
the discussion:
“General methodology of science can give a lot in the area of integration of science since 
in recent years it has been increasingly seeking for contact with the so-called special 
sciences thus strengthening their inclination toward methodological reflection in 
their respective domains” [Topolski, 1965, p. 4; emphasis added; authors’ translation];
“regarding (…) the aspect (…) which encompasses theoretical-methodological condi-
tions of the process of integration of science, philosophy, and in particular the branch 
called methodology of science, can play a special role in the analysis of this aspect (…) 
I am stating here only possibility, not the factual situation” [Kmita, 1975, p. 8; emphasis 
added; authors’ translation];
“methodology as means of integrating scientific research represented by particular 
humanistic specialties” [Kmita, 1973a, p. 76; emphasis in original ].
While the methodology does not enter the scheme of integration as a sub-
stantial part, on equal basis with the disciplines being integrated, still its 
inclusion in the integration trial suggests integration is a trinary relation. 
In our view, there are three parts of integration: the sides being integrated 
(x and y) and the integrative side (the integrator, z) via which the integration 
of x and y is taking place, x is being integrated with y via z3. However, in the 
classical, reductionist account of integration this trinary relation collapses 
to become a binary one, because one of the integrated sides and integrative 
side are identical, y = z. If we take an anti-reductionist account of integra-
tion, a symmetry takes place: if x is being integrated with y via z, y is being 
integrated with x via z. The integration of x and y is symmetric relative to the 
3 We leave open here the question whether integration of x with y by starting from x and 
via z, will result in the same effect as if we integrated y with x starting from y and via z.
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integrator z. Therefore, a symmetric anti-reductionist account of integration 
assumes the existence of two symmetrical integrated sides and an integrative 
side which differs from them. In that sense, the sides undergoing integration 
are not privileged, while the integrative side is not a basic discipline, it is 
a connective one. Therefore, we propose the general methodology of science 
as a candidate for the integrator (integrative discipline).
Let us now consider what makes general methodology a discipline capable 
of actively participating in integration trials and successfully playing the role 
of an integrator. As the Poznań Methodological School did not provide any 
clear-cut answers in this respect, we make an attempt at filling this gap by using 
some recent basic findings of Nicky Priaulx and Martin Weinel. The authors 
offer an “agenda for addressing the kind of extra-disciplinary knowledge that 
might help to stimulate, enhance and initiate cross-disciplinary collaboration” 
[Priaulx, Weinel, 2018, p. 15]. They distinguish two kinds of knowledge: ‘of-
knowledge’ which implies a detailed understanding of a given field acquired 
in the course of collaboration with researchers from other fields and ‘about-
knowledge’ which implies some basic familiarity with information about other 
fields and issues crucial to them. The latter is not knowledge of connections 
between different fields or disciplines, but connective knowledge “that makes 
connections possible” [Priaulx, Weinel, 2018, p. 15]. Although the authors 
do not explicitly point to methodology as a domain of “about-knowledge”, it 
appears that general methodology of science can meet expectations of being 
such a domain provided it is viewed in a non-traditional way, i.e. neither as 
a descriptive discipline (“what are the connections between disciplines in 
integration trials?”) nor as a normative one (“what should be the connec-
tions between disciplines to make integration trial successful?”). Instead, one 
could ask “what might the connections between disciplines be?”, focusing on 
the programming role of methodology, even though with “no guarantee that 
such connections will be made, or that if made, that they will be successful” 
[Priaulx, Weinel, 2018, p. 15]. ‘About-knowledge’ enhances then the awareness 
of potential connections between different fields4.
4 In other words, such awareness consists in researchers’ attitudes towards their own re-
search specialization and the place of the latter in the whole system of science, as well as attitudes 
towards other domains of knowledge and of culture [Łojewska, 1976, p. 58].
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To sum up our preliminaries, critical analysis of the discussion about the 
definition, levels and structure of integration of sciences enables us to clarify 
our account on integration in the following way:
• integration is about connecting research findings – it is more than juxta-
position but less than merging;
• integration is about enriching discipline-specific world-views – it transcend 
the narrow discipline-specific world-views but not beyond necessity, 
being thus less than reconciliation;
• integration is a trinary relation – it involves at least two integrated sides 
and one integrative (connective) played by the general methodology 
of sciences.
It is now clear enough that some partial conclusions and suggestions that 
were generated during the discussion about the definition, levels and structure 
of integration in the second half of the XX century in Poland remain still 
valid. However, as the aim of this paper is both to engage the contemporary 
discussion about the nature of relations between different scientific disciplines, 
as well as to disentangle the concept of integration of sciences from super-
structures of rival proposals (unification and interdisciplinarity), this partial 
conclusions and suggestions need to be refined and supplemented. On the 
one hand, the refinement consists in introducing and adapting the concept 
of connective knowledge, as well as localizing it as belonging to the domain 
of the methodology of humanities. On the other hand, the supplementation 
arises from the need to update the Poznań Methodological School’s account 
on integration and to tailor it to the context of scientific practices that to 
large extent are based on the method of modelling. As there is a multiplicity 
of types of models and their functions in scientific investigations, we argue 
that integration of sciences may be conducive to a certain type of modelling, 
namely the exploratory one. Finally, our investigations aims also at meeting 
some recent postulate raised by the community of philosophers of social 
sciences that “[i]ntegration is another popular term desperately in need of 
analysis” [Mäki, 2016, p. 338]. 
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3. Disentanglement of the concept of integration from 
unification and interdisciplinarity 
3.1. Integration / unification 
We have already said that in contemporary discussions terms ‘integration’ 
and ‘unification’ are often used interchangeably or the terms or their derivatives 
are too often put together with an ‘or’. Undoubtedly, it is not conducive for the 
clarity of discussion on problems of integration of sciences. However, one can 
point to some non-trivial examples of differentiating between these concepts. 
Some of them are contextual and rather vague. They are in a way a by-product of 
considerations which are not directly oriented to these topics although they are 
related to them. For instance, Jaakko Hintikka and Ilpo Halonen by questioning 
the relation between unification and explanation and by making reference to the 
example of the special theory of relativity, noted that this theory “was an attempt 
to integrate the laws of electrodynamics with the laws of mechanics, in the first 
place with the laws of motion. Einstein’s theory is not an explanation of either 
set of laws; it is a synthesis of the two. (…) Historically speaking, it neverthe-
less is somewhat dubious to call that integration process unification” [Halonen, 
Hintikka, 1999, p. 38]. Also in contemporary broad discussions concerning the 
reduction of psychology to neuroscience, a similar problem is noted: “psychol-
ogy and neuroscience are and should be connected and perhaps integrated, but 
not unified” [Schouten, Looren de Jong, 2007, p. 21]. What is more, a growing 
number of scholars distinguish these concepts explicitly. Instead of using the 
misleading phrase “unification or integration’ we get the following:
• “integration without unification” [Mitchell, Dietrich, 2006];
• “unification beyond integration” [Marquis, Wibler, 2008];
• “unification versus integration” [Miłkowski, 2016].
The most important distinctions that have been pointed out include:
• globality / locality [Bechtel, 1993, pp. 277-278; Wylie, 1999, p. 300; 
Mitchell, 2003, p. 190; Brigandt, 2010, pp. 306-307];
• non-exclusionarity / exclusionarity [van der Steen, 1993, p. 273; Mar-
quis, Wibler, 2008, p. 351; O’Malley, 2013, p. 559; Breitenbach, Choi, 
2017, p. 397];
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• simplicity / complexity [Mitchell, 2003, p. 190; Brigandt, 2010, pp. 306-
307; Gerson, 2013, p. 517; Miłkowski, 2016, p. 16].
The first option, integration without unification, is first of all related with 
the criterion of globality / locality. There can be successful integration trials 
without general theoretical frameworks. In this sense general theoretical frame-
works are not required for integration. It is particularly visible in sciences in 
which fundamental theories are not available. We can then paraphrase integra-
tion without unification option in the way that unification is not a sine qua non 
condition of integration, which, as a result, allows us to make integration trials 
but not unification trials. What is more, as Wim van der Steen noted: „ideal 
of unification as such is not sufficient as a warrant for integrationism” [van 
der Steen, 1990, p. 34; emphasis in original]. We then get a very informative 
statement on the relations between unification and integration:
Unification is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of integration.
The second option, unification beyond integration, is typical for propo-
nents of unification, who are often opponents of integration. One of them is 
for instance David Trafimov, who discusses the issues which are of interest for 
us in psychology. He notices that integration tendencies in psychology do oc-
cur although they insufficiently take up unification efforts: „integration falls 
well short of unification. Psychologists should unify but, at best, they integrate” 
[Trafimov, 2012, p. 702]. Thus, for proponents of unification, integration appear 
to be excessively eclectic and they consider it results not in a unified whole but 
in heaps. In order to move towards a holistic approach, one needs to go beyond 
integration. Therefore, the unification beyond integration option is tightly re-
lated to the criterion of exclusionarity / non-exclusionarity, because unification 
understood in such a way is a “radically nonexclusionary approach” [Marquis, 
Wibler, 2008 p. 351]. The non-exclusionarity criterion is particularly strongly 
exposed in contemporary unification accounts, which are intended to be in line 
with the stance of pluralism in science. The claim that the goal of unification 
is the pursuit of the final state of unified science is rejected, while unification 
means a common, continuous cooperation on given problems. This creates 
room for the cognitive value of pluralism – when pluralism is linked to a joint, 
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collective engagement, thus allowing for overcoming cognitive limitations of 
particular individuals, it contributes to cognitive progress. A considerable con-
sequence of such an approach is that an important limitation can be established:
“Unified pluralism embraces a wide range of pluralisms but imposes one important, 
governing limitation: it rules out ways of proceeding that undermine the continued 
cooperation and collaboration necessary to make a virtue out of pluralism. Unified 
pluralism thus excludes only but all exclusionary projects” [Breitenbach, Choi 2017, 
p. 397; emphasis added].
Proponents of unified pluralism consider as an exclusionary approach for 
instance treating evidence against a given concept as evidence in favor of it. It 
is characteristic of, for instance, the so-called conspiracy theories. The notion 
of unification, as it is stated in the above-mentioned extract, excludes only but 
all exclusionary projects. In this respect integration opposed to unification is less 
inclusive or at least integration can in particular cases exclude more than just 
exclusionary projects. As Maureen O’Malley put it: “integration does not always 
mean greater inclusiveness of data, methods or explanation […]. Integration 
may involve considerable exclusiveness to achieve the desired integrative aim” 
[O’Malley, 2013, p. 559; emphasis added]. Of course, one should not understand 
it in a way that exclusivity is a necessary condition of integration but rather than:
Non-exclusionarity is not a necessary condition of integration.
The option unification versus integration strongly opposes two conver-
gence tendencies. In this sense, we can treat it as an exclusive disjunction. It 
is particularly visible when we take into account the simplicity / complexity 
opposition. In this aspect integration is related to complicating, gradually 
increasing the complexity of the object of research and it is opposed to sim-
plification and idealization, which are typically linked to unification. Instead 
of providing simplification, we then recognize connections between various 
parameters and this way we increase the complexity of the object of research. 
The following statements in this respect are symptomatic:
“Integrative models would have to be very complex” [van der Steen, 1990, p. 29];
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“Without (…) a unified theoretical framework (…) one is left with a piecemeal approach 
to integration. This view recognizes (…) the nonindependence of at least some of the 
contributions to complex combinations” [Mitchell, 2003, p. 207];
“partial integration connects specialties in complex and occasionally durable ways 
without leading to unification of them” [Gerson, 2013, p. 517];
“greater integration leading away from simplicity toward greater complexity” [Plutynski, 
2013, p. 470];
“the results of integration need not be simple, beautiful, or general, (…) [T]he resulting 
scientific representation may be highly redundant, violate parsimony considerations, 
and so forth” [Miłkowski, 2016, pp. 18-19].
Taking into account the above statements, increasing the simplicity re-
duces redundancy. In this respect, Marcin Miłkowski warns that reducing 
redundancy always comes at a cost. One should pay attention to the fact that 
increasing simplicity beyond necessity (as the Occam’s razor principle puts 
it) can lead to undesired consequences:
“first, it may make the representation more susceptible to error (as redundancy helps er-
ror detection); second, it requires more computational effort to handle non-redundant 
representation. For this reason, models of mechanisms should be as simple and parsi-
monious only as far as it aids their uses” [Miłkowski, 2016, p. 26; emphasis in original].
Unification, contrary to integration, leads to formulating general, simple 
and global theoretical approaches of the investigated phenomena. Integra-
tion, on the other hand, is focused on tackling more local problems, taking 
into account their complexity – their multi-aspect character and plurality of 
relations. Unification and integration are therefore guided by different aims. 
One could thus risk to say that:
Simplicity and integration are inversely correlated with one another.
2.2.  Integration / interdisciplinarity
In many discussions which took place in 70-90. of the XXth century 
interdisciplinarity was strictly associated with integration. It was a common 
conviction that integration is the necessary condition for the success of inter-
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disciplinary projects. The relation between integration and interdisciplinarity 
is however questioned. William Bechtel pointed out that if researchers from 
various disciplines exchange information and share ideas but remain closely 
attached to their own disciplines, we then have interdisciplinarity but without 
integration [Bechtel, 1993, p. 295]. What is more, if the exchange does not 
concern some uncharted territory which can be explored thanks to coopera-
tion and working out new approaches, methods or research instruments, then 
we have interdisciplinary clusters but not integration of sciences [Bechtel, 
Hamilton, 2007, p. 405]. Although, as we have signaled in the introduction 
to this article, while questioning the relation between integration and inter-
disciplinarity could be viewed as a heresy, it contributes to the clarity of the 
discussion and makes possible to better conceptualization of the former. One 
should not infer that the approach already considered as traditional, that is 
defining interdisciplinarity via integration becomes entirely questioned. It just 
becomes one of the three options we have in this context:
• “interdisciplinary integration” [Klein, 2010];
• “(successful) interdisciplinarity without integration” [Grüne-Yanoff, 2016];
• “integration without (much) interdisciplinarity” [Brigandt, 2013].
Conceptual oppositions, which serve to explicate the difference between 
integration and interdisciplinarity are then as follows:
• distal / proximal [Karlqvist, 1999, p. 382];
• loose / strong links [van der Steen, 1990, p. 34].
When it comes to the first option – interdisciplinary integration, it is 
considered a classical one, because this is how interdisciplinarity is the most 
often being distinguished from multidisciplinarity. Successful interdisciplinary 
integrations, which have resulted in the emergence of new scientific disciplines, 
also fit into this area. Classical example in this respect is biochemistry, which 
should not be treated as applied organic chemistry but as a discipline with its 
own domain [Bechtel 1986b, pp. 97-98].
When it comes to the second option – (successful) interdisciplinarity 
without integration, the relation between integration and interdisciplinarity 
was firmly questioned by Wim J. van der Steen, who in a way denounced 
certain interdisciplinary projects as pseudo-integration. He qualified as such 
the extension of sociobiology to humanities, biological theories of culture and 
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some research from the area of biological psychiatry. The key to denounce the 
pseudo-integrational character is the excessive use of overgeneral, “diluted,” 
concepts and failing to see the distinctive conceptual character of objects of 
research in various disciplines. An example of this first flaw are overgeneraliza-
tions of concepts from the area of evolutionary biology (for instance, adapta-
tion), which is how they become uninformative. An example of the second 
pseudo-integration is the failure to notice distinct conceptualizations of culture 
(biology versus anthropology) or altruism (sociobiology versus ethics). We 
then have to do with only a superficial and illusory similarity of the objects 
of research. The conclusions the author draws here are clear:
„The use of overgeneral concepts tends to suggest that there is theoretical coherence, 
within or among disciplines, where none in fact exists” [van der Steen, 1990, pp. 24-25; 
emphasis in original];
“Pseudo-integration is common in science” [van der Steen, 1993, p. 272].
While van der Steen focused on denouncing pseudo-integration in interdis-
ciplinarity, Till Grüne-Yanoff presented case studies in which the successful inter-
disciplinary interaction neither is based nor leads to the integration of disciplines. 
The conclusion is that the integration is not the necessary condition for successful 
interdisciplinarity [Grüne-Yanoff, 2016, pp. 358-359]. One of such case studies is 
the example of evolutionary game theory, which is the effect of interdisciplinary 
exchange between biology and economics. An important argument here is that 
it was an authentic interdisciplinary interaction and not only a multidisciplinary 
juxtaposition. First of all, there was a mutual exchange, “mutual adoption”. First, 
the biologists imported the game theory from economics and then economists 
re-imported it from biology. What is more, as a result of this exchange there was 
a double impact of these disciplines on one another. The disciplines were affected 
by one another and in this sense they both changed their identity:
“the involved disciplines are substantially affected. (…) the interdisciplinary exchange 
lead to epistemic success – to more detailed explanations, better control, and higher 
scientific activity. Crucially, the interdisciplinary exchange was an important causal 
factor in the production of this success. (…) From either transfer, the importing 
discipline came out considerably affected” [Grüne-Yanoff, 2016, p. 349].
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Although the example of the evolutionary game theory is not a juxtaposi-
tion of results of biology and economics, the author claims it is not an example 
of integration either. Even though we had a situation of mutual exchange and 
mutual impact, there was no convergence of knowledge. Attempts of integrat-
ing these two sciences met with difficulties of ontological and methodological 
kind. What is interesting, “disintegrating” occurred during the attempts of 
overcoming these difficulties: “The real changes, instead, arose from attempts 
to deal with these obstacles. In trying to overcome them, scientists from 
both discipline worked out discipline-specific concepts and methods, and 
in that process moved their discipline away from the other” [Grüne-Yanoff, 
2016, p. 349]. Therefore, we get interdisciplinarity but without integration. 
In this respect, stating that interdisciplinarity “presupposes as a minimum 
that some sort of inter-action and integration between at least two relevantly 
different disciplines take place” [Hvidtfeldt, 2017, p. 38; emphasis in original] 
is inadequate because this minimal condition is too narrowly defined. It is 
the interaction condition that should be treated as a minimal condition and 
in this sense as a sine qua non condition [Lattuca, 2001, p. 14; Holbrook, 
2013, p. 1874]. On the other hand, interaction understood as a symmetric 
relation, interchange or in short just exchange, implies a mutual impact 
between the disciplines. In this respect we have a “genuine interdisciplinary 
episode that left both disciplines considerably transformed, but not integrated” 
[Grüne-Yanoff, 2015, p. 708; emphasis added]. From the above, we can draw 
a following thesis:
Interaction and not integration is a necessary condition of interdisciplinarity.
The above-mentioned considerations should be accompanied by an impor-
tant comment. Formula “interdisciplinarity without integration” should not be 
treated in an absolute manner, i.e. that there is no trace of connections whatso-
ever. It should be understood in a way that there occur interconnections in the 
non-integration interdisciplinarity but they are loose or weak [van der Steen, 
1990, p. 34; Wylie 1999, p. 301]. A good case in point here are sustainability 
sciences. They are also a good example of interdisciplinary exchange as we have 
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a transfer between the disciplines which are very distant from one another, for 
instance, oceanography and political sciences. In this respect, the integration 
is very unlikely. For sustainability sciences the key to interdisciplinarity is the 
problem-feeding – the transfer of problems and their solutions between differ-
ent, sometimes pretty distant disciplines. Integration is then unlikely and is not 
a necessary condition but cooperation and the transfer of problems do occur:
“the theoretical interconnections that must be in place in order for problem-feeding 
to ensue can be comparatively weak. Some connection needs to be in place, but noth-
ing as substantive as, say, an interfield theory needs to exist. (…) Most philosophical 
treatments concentrate on disciplinary fields that are in many respects proximate. They 
share much at the outset, and this makes the sharing and shifting of problems a lot 
smoother. Within sustainability science this is decidedly not the case –at least, when it 
comes to integrating the natural and social dimensions of sustainability. However (…) 
this does not undermine the recognition that problems need to be transferred” [Thorén, 
Persson, 2013, pp. 351-352; emphasis in original].
We could therefore risk the following thesis:
Interdisciplinarity is impossible without even loose interconnections.
We are facing an analogical problem when we consider the third option – 
the opposite possibility i.e. integration without interdisciplinarity, because 
to be precise we have a situation in which “such integrative accounts do not 
involve much interdisciplinarity” [Brigandt, 2013, p. 461]. We then consider 
neighboring research fields or we stay within the realm of one discipline. It 
does not mean though that integration remains a trivial task here. It is about 
integration of knowledge pertaining to different levels of organization or 
research on different levels of analysis. There occur epistemological and meth-
odological problems specific to integration, which concern relations between 
levels and, what is particularly important, relations between different levels 
but concerning the same phenomena.
In the level-of-analysis approach from the field of biological sciences it 
is assumed that each hypothesis or model comes within one of four distin-
guished levels: evolutionary, functional, ontogenetic and mechanistic. Lack of 
differentiation between these levels leads to terminological misunderstand-
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ings and unwarranted polemics. Another important issue of levelism is that 
competition between alternatives occurs only within the realm of particular 
levels and not between them [Sherman, 1988, pp. 616-617]. Sandra Mitchell, 
advocate of integrated pluralism, accepts the first element of levelism but re-
jects the second one. According to the author, accepting the second element 
of levelism leads to isolationism which is unjustified from the point of view 
of research practice of biological sciences:
“While the levels-of-analysis approach correctly recognizes the diversity of questions 
that can be raised, it fails to acknowledge that the answers at one level may well influ-
ence what can be a plausible or probable answer at another. (…) The view of pluralism 
that I endorse is not “anything goes” or “winner takes all” or “levels of analysis” but 
rather integrative pluralism, which attempts to do justice to the multilevel, multicom-
ponent, evolved character of complex systems. But, one may reasonably ask, what kind 
of integration?” [Mitchell, 2009, pp. 112-114; emphasis in original].
Answering to the above question we could state that:
• integration is not isolationist – interrelatedness between particular levels 
is assumed; questions formulated on one of the levels cannot be an-
swered in a satisfactory manner without considerations on other levels; 
it is especially important in a situation when considerations on one of 
the levels limit the scope of possible answers on the remaining levels;
• integration is not reductionist – it does not call for a privileged level, 
which should be targeted by all the proposed explanations;
• integration is not formalistic – there is no a purely formal procedure or 
algorithm of interlevel integration.
The author of integrative pluralism illustrated her account with examples 
from biological sciences. However, as she underlined: “[b]oth the ontology 
and the representation of complex systems recommend adopting a stance 
of integrative pluralism, not only in biology, but in general [Mitchell, 2004, 
p. 81; emphasis added]. The stance of integrative pluralism is also possible in 
the social sciences and humanities. Communication studies can be an ex-
ample, where we have three levels of analysis defined by Claude Shannon: 
transmissional, semantic and effectiveness. In this respect we can also have 
isolationist or reductionist approaches. However, an integrative approach is 
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possible in communication studies, where interrelatedness between levels 
of analysis can be seen [Boruszewski, 2017, pp. 22-24]. Of course, an inter-
level integration generates epistemological and methodological problems 
of sort – above all it requires caution and big awareness of the levels of 
analysis and interrelatedness between them: „Integrating across levels of 
analysis is tricky business. (…) Although there is risk of confusion, careful 
consideration of one level of analysis can benefit at the other” [MacDougall-
Shackleton, 2011, p. 2083]. 
In the light of the above considerations, we could therefore state the fol-
lowing thesis:
Distality as such makes integration more difficult, while proximity as such 
does not make it easier.
Let us now sum up this section. In the following diagram we illustrate 
the way in which we conceptualize the relations of integration to unification 
and interdisciplinarity:
Diagram 1: Disentanglement of integration from unification and interdisciplinarity. 
We consider the scopes of concepts of integration and unification as dis-
junctive although adjacent. In other words, these concepts are mutually exclu-
sive although some transitions (“leaps”) between them are possible, namely 
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unification beyond integration and integration without unification. In this 
sense we treat the overused phrase ‘unification or integration’ as denoting the 
union of scopes of these two concepts with an empty intersection. Meanwhile, 
the scopes of the concepts of integration and interdisciplinarity intersect in 
a non-empty way. What is more important, however, are the differences of 
scopes of these two concepts and the fact that they also are not empty sets. In 
this respect, phrases such as ‘interdisciplinary integration’ are not trivial as it 
was the case in traditional approaches. We propose an analogous solution in 
the case of unification and interdisciplinarity although as it is not the subject 
of this article, we leave the question open.
4. A successful integration – a case study
As we have already specified our account of integration of sciences and dis-
entangled it from the superstructures of unification and interdisciplinarity, let 
us now support it with a case study. We take into consideration a model of magi-
cal archaic culture with its central formula in the form of the idea of primitive 
magic syncretism to show a successful integration trial, which meets the main 
characteristics of integration presented in our account. This theoretical model 
may be considered as the effect of an encounter of groups of specialists with 
different disciplinary background including archeologists (Henryk Mamzer, 
Andrzej P. Kowalski), ethnologists (Wojciech Burszta, Michał Buchowski) and 
methodologists of humanities (Jerzy Kmita, Anna Pałubicka). This meeting 
resulted in connecting various autonomous research findings concerning 
interpretations of material remnants (archeology), indigenous knowledge of 
contemporary small-scale traditional societies (ethnology), as well as relicts 
of magical thinking in speech (linguistics). Establishing this connection was 
possible only when accompanied by a critical reconceptualization of the em-
pirical basis of historical sciences about culture (epistemic level). In order to go 
beyond the traditional view that archeological remnants are merely remainings 
of material culture to be catalogized, the empirical basis was reconceptualized 
so as to include the idea that such remnants also played a sacral or ritual func-
tion which has to be reconstructed. The idea was to reconstruct the place of 
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a magical world-view in the past, but also in various domains of contemporary 
culture, e.g. art, religion or, as Jerzy Kmita put it, even in science (ideational 
level). Last but not least, such an integration trial would be hardly possible 
without the methodology of humanities entering the scheme of integration as 
the integrator. It was possible, because, as Kmita has recognized, methodology 
“belongs (…) to the sphere of the historical sciences about (symbolic) culture” 
[Kmita, 1974, pp. 47-48]. Let us now go to the case study. 
The project of a theoretical account of magic was worked out by Anna 
Pałubicka and then developed in an milieu of researchers with different dis-
ciplinary background. The basis of this project is a model of magical archaic 
culture [Burszta, 1991, p. 101; Kowalski, 1997, p. 166; Bińczyk, 2007, p. 102]. 
The basic problem for us is how to investigate archaic preliterate cultures, 
when we are faced with unsurmountable epistemological difficulties in their 
discovering? The complexity of this problem manifests itself already at the 
basic, conceptual level – how the term ‘culture’ is understood in prehistorical 
research. Pałubicka paid attention to the dual understanding of the term. In 
the first sense we speak about archeological culture, a defined set of material 
artifacts located in time and space, while in the second understanding the 
culture takes the form of beliefs shared in a given community and remnants are 
its symptoms and a base to reconstruct the culture: „the starting point in this 
process of reconstruction is made by the data from archeological culture, and 
the point of arrival – aim – data which make culture” [Pałubicka, 1979, p. 60]. 
Here appears the first cognitive barrier in investigating of magical cultures – it 
is practically impossible to reconstruct a magical culture solely based on the 
archeological sources. It is not possible to present the past in a purely physical 
way and certainly one cannot attribute a cultural status to material objects as 
such without making a reference to a given model of culture. Also, one can-
not limit oneself to describing the purely physical qualities of objects because 
presumably these qualities were linked to their symbolic function: „classes of 
objects like Neolithic polished stone implements may have been, in the culture 
of that age, a metamorphic presentation of sky gods or a sacral force manifest-
ing itself through the lustre, for example” [Kowalski, 2009, p. 36]. Without a ref-
erence to a theoretical model of culture objects were under a certain illusion 
of direct contact with the past – an illusion of cultural transparency of objects. 
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On the other side of the spectrum, the “purely mental” one, there appears the 
second cognitive barrier – the impossibility to understand archaic cultures in 
the sense of antinaturalistic methodology of humanities. More precisely, the 
way of thinking characteristic of primary societies is uninterpretable or hard 
to comprehend to contemporary people from the Euro-Atlantic cultural circle. 
The reality of archaic culture is usually incomprehensible to us:
“This is why the cultures alien to our culture, that is, the ‘primitives’ cultures which 
accept the states of affairs and the ‘mystical’ relations between them that we take to 
be unacceptable are unintelligible to us. The states and the relations can be expressed 
in our concepts, and therefore comprehended by us in this sense. Still, we cannot 
recognize their objectivity. This is the obstacle that makes our attempt to understand 
them vain. Although it is possible for us to find out what the states of affairs and the 
relations between them are present in the ‘primitive’ cultures, we are not able to un-
derstand how one can believe in such things” [Pałubicka, 1998, p. 186].
The model of archaic culture is therefore meant to enable an approxima-
tive description of this culture, its conceptual articulation. At its basis, three 
historical forms of world-view valorization are distinguished, that is ways of 
combining practical activities with convictions concerning world-views. This 
way we single out magical, religious and modern valorization [Pałubicka, 1985]. 
Then the above-mentioned problem is how to characterize communities be-
longing to magical cultures from the modern culture perspective. Subjects 
participating in modern culture usually distinguish three spheres of culture: 
technical-instrumental, symbolic-communicative and world-view. According 
to the central hypothesis of the model, spheres of consciousness in primeval 
societies made up a united syncretic whole. For primeval people particular 
activities were a technical, communicative and world-view act at once. In other 
words, in primeval minds metonymical (cause-effect, whole-part) and meta-
phorical (symbolization) relations coexisted. Therefore, the primeval mind 
does not perform a mutual transformation of these relations on one another 
because it would mean that it differentiates between them. The differentiation 
between metonymy and metaphor appeared only later on:
“The formula: primitive magic syncretism – is supposed not only to show that primi-
tive magic is involved, but, in the first place, that syncretism is stressed which does 
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not mean (as it is generally understood) combining already distinguished elements, 
but – on the contrary – the combined appearance of elements which only from a later 
point of view are considered to be different” [Kmita, 1989, p. 157; emphasis added].
The central formula of the model, that is the primitive magic syncretism, 
could be also developed into a full hypothesis concerning participation in 
the primitive magical culture: “Each participant of the production is at the 
same time the producer, the sender of the message and the advocate of world 
view (magical) valorization” [Pałubicka, 1985, p. 65; emphasis added]. The 
simultaneous coexistence of metonymy and metaphor in primitive magic 
syncretism is sometimes called a palimpsest [Leach, 1976, p. 25]. This term is 
instructive in the sense that it reveals additional difficulties in translating state-
ments taken from magical cultures, for instance ‘A stag is a feather’, ‘We are 
Araras’, into a language understandable for us. Each attempt of translation and 
interpretation can be a partial paraphrase at most. What is more, if we have 
many of such partial paraphrases, their sum also won’t be an adequate rendi-
tion of the unique sense of expressions from magical cultures. A translation 
of a metonymic-metaphorical palimpsest is in principle impossible because 
in the magical thinking “there is neither metaphor (…) nor statement about 
metonymy (…); it consists of both of them at once, and at the same time it has 
none of these meanings in pure form” [Buchowski, 1996, pp. 307-308]. There-
fore, one cannot attribute a purely symbolical status to magical linguistic 
statements because it would be an imputation on the side of the researcher. 
Similarly, one cannot attribute a purely instrumental, technical character to 
material objects (for instance, a piece of pottery or biface) without taking into 
account their symbolic sense. It is also a bias on the side of the contemporary 
western culture: “through our own research method, we imply the priority of 
the technological role of culture over its other, especially symbolic, aspects” 
[Mamzer, 2009, pp. 96-97].
The model of primitive magic syncretism is the result of integration in 
a twofold way. The first one concerns the interdisciplinary and integrative 
character. In developing this model mainly the output of historical sciences, 
ethnology and archeology is used, with addition of research work in the field 
of linguistics and religious studies. It does not come as a surprise because 
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the archaic culture, which is the particular and specific subject-matter, is the 
object of interest of many disciplines. What is much more important here is 
that methodology of humanities serves as the integrating means (the integra-
tor). Secondly, we have to do with integration of two levels of analysis – the 
physical level and the mental level. The archeological findings can be described 
in two ways – as a physical object and as an object used in a given way in 
a certain community. On the first level we have a description of the portion 
of the matter occurring in given time and taking a specific space, while in the 
second description we place a given find in a cultural context adequate to it. 
The context equips the find with a cultural sense, thanks to which the object 
described in a physical way becomes a cultural object. In this respect one 
can distinguish two different account of the empirical basis in the research 
on preliterate culture. The first of them, the traditional one, means catalogu-
ing – making descriptions of physical objects using terms of their observed 
properties. In the second one the empirical base is: “interpretatively construed 
within the perspective of readiness-to-hand. Hence, the tools interpreted by 
meaning ascription make up the empirical basis for further investigation of 
culture” [Pałubicka, 2009, pp. 63-64].These descriptions cannot be inferred 
from one another and cannot be reduced to one another, in particular a mental 
description is irreducible to a physical description. The integration of two 
levels of analysis in researching old cultures enables to show the particular 
interaction between them. As Andrzej P. Kowalski noted, the model of primi-
tive magic syncretism is useful in prehistorical research although not as a basis 
of classification of archeological matter, because archeology has worked out 
its own methods in this respect. However, this model makes it possible to re-
interpret and to correct archeological interpretations, to which the researchers 
attributed a cultural character. It allows us to explain the cultural dimension 
of the presence of given objects in a given culture [Kowalski, 1997, p. 166]. In 
this respect taking into account of the mental description imposes a certain 
requirement of interpretive criticism on spontaneous acts of ascribing a cultural 
sense to old tools. This spontaneity is expressed in that the researcher to some 
extent unintentionally ascribes a sense from their own culture although “since 
spontaneous recognition of meaning may in many cases be misguided, it is 
necessary to explore further research techniques like methodical and critical 
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interpretation which aim at meaning-ascription” [Pałubicka, 2009, p. 61]. The 
other way round, physical descriptions can serve as basis of selecting mental 
descriptions and thus reduce the speculative character of humanistic con-
siderations. This speculativity is expressed in arbitrarily ascribing subjective 
intentionality, which can lead to a situation, in which scientific analysis of 
old cultures is driven out by eseistic visions of the researcher. The physical 
description therefore represents a criterion of selecting mental descriptions 
although it does not form the foundation for investigating culture. We there-
fore have mutual interaction between the levels of description: correction of 
spontaneity (mental-physical relation) and selection of speculation (physical-
mental relation). In this respect we can point to a significant cognitive value 
of the integrated model of primitive magic syncretism.
5. Concluding remarks: methodology of science  
as an integrator in integration trials
In considerations regarding the problems of integration two of its levels 
are clearly underlined: the practical-institutional one and the epistemic-meth-
odological one. Analysis of the notion of integration show they both play an 
important role. Van der Steen, when denouncing the pseudo-integration, he 
paid attention to the fact that even though certain institutional conditions are 
met (exchange, cooperation, publications), adequate methodological condi-
tions were not met. According to the author, integration “would be possible 
only if certain institutional resources would be available and if certain meth-
odological criteria could be satisfied” [van der Steen, 1993b, p. 349; emphasis 
in original]. The author expressed a strong disappointment with the then (first 
half of 1990s) philosophy of sciences in this respect: 
“Philosophers who do not care for elementary reconstructions of live science will end up 
with a very biased view of science” [van der Steen, Sloep, 1993, p. 23; emphasis added];
“In order to make philosophy of science more practical, one had better start with 
application of elementary, relatively uncontroversial philosophy (especially logic) to 
problem of science” [van der Steen, 1990, p. 24; emphasis in original];
“It is unfortunate that conceptual analysis is not very popular in the philosophy of 
science nowadays” [van der Steen, 1993a, p. 265].
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The three quotations mentioned above illustrate this disappointment and 
their content undoubtedly remains relevant. One can therefore speak of a cer-
tain methodological deficit in the analysis of integration of science. It is visible 
for instance in a specific renunciation of the analysis on the basic, conceptual 
level or even in setting aside some inconvenient problems:
“it can also take the form of a denial of the persistent heterogeneity of the conceptual 
bases of science in progress and, on the whole, this heterogeneity is seldom analyzed. 
(…) But, for a cross cutting critique to be possible, and for real progress to be made in 
the integration of scientific knowledge, it is necessary to build analytical frameworks 
that allow take into account that every research programme claims its own domain 
of demonstration and its own validation criteria. That is why it seems necessary, at 
a meta level, to construct analyses which on common bases explicate the hypotheses 
of heterogeneous research programmes, their criteria of scientificity, the part of arbi-
trary of each approach, and the limits of empirical validity of their results” [Laurent, 
2012, p. 230; emphasis added].
The above comments should not be understood in a way that a need 
emerges to work out a super-science or a meta-discipline which will automati-
cally deal with the above-mentioned problems. It is also not about constructing 
a new high-level formal theoretical apparatus. Classically such hopes have been 
pinned on the General Systems Theory and integration of science remains an 
evergreen challenge for this theory [Solem, 1993]. However, the success in 
this respect is at the very least doubtful. Still, it is a perspective of a different 
kind – the GST can play a certain role in integration but it does not constitute 
rudimentary knowledge. And this science has to be more implicit and rather 
focused on know-how because it is to constitute the basis for commitments 
in integration. Instead of taking up the evergreen challenge for the high-level 
general theory, it seems much more fruitful to take up the actual challenge 
by using the good old tools from the methodological toolbox. Having a com-
mon specialist knowledge is one thing, but it is about having some common 
basic knowledge. The latter is treated as a condition of successful integration 
because it facilitates coordination without explicit communication, common 
knowledge acts as a kind of infrastructure for the social world that it supports. 
Common knowledge is built, modified, and used jointly; by its nature, no one 
can have exclusive use, possession, or control of it. In this respect, common 
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knowledge is analogous to the system of public roads, or utility networks 
[Gerson, 2013, p. 518]. In this respect it is not about having knowledge of 
another field or discipline, but knowledge about it. Integration by sharing 
common knowledge-of is possible only in rare cases when we have special-
ists from the field of at least two disciplines. In this respect the requirement 
of the specialistic knowledge-of can prove impractical or excessive because it 
is important to have the knowledge-about the other integrated part, i.e. con-
nective knowledge, which is:
„a range of fairly simple facts and information about the sorts of problem domains and 
approaches that populate different fields and specialisms” [Priaulx, Weinel, 2018, p. 8];
“a far lower-level and rudimentary knowledge about the kinds of work and approaches 
that populate a range of academic fields and specialisms” [Ibidem, p. 12];
“Connective knowledge in this sense is not knowledge of connections, but the kind 
of knowledge that makes connections possible” [Ibidem, p. 15; emphasis in original].
Considerations on connective knowledge suggest that in the scheme of 
integration a third element should appear, that the relation of integration is in 
fact a trinary relation. This third element can be called an integrator. In order to 
explain how much adequate such an approach is, let us recall similar considera-
tions concerning unification, where issues pointing to the existence of a third 
element appeared. It can be for instance ethics of science understood as unifier 
of science [Agassi, 1969, p. 470]. A more important proposal in this respect 
can be the correction in the understanding of unificatory relation of reduction 
proposed by Adam Grobler. Let us remind that in the classical unificationist 
approach, reduction is a binary (there is the reduced and the reducing side) 
and asymmetric relation. The correction is aimed at the following extremely 
important remark: „problem does not consist in which (present-day or future) 
science is being reduced to which one, but by means of which one” [Grobler, 
1982, p. 91; emphasis in original]. In this proposal the relation of reduction is 
a trinary relation – apart from the reduced and the reducing theories, there 
is also a third theory, via which the reduction is realized – a reducer. The 
author of the notion of reducer paid attention to the fact that some branches 
of mathematics can act as reducers. We can therefore paraphrase a passage 
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from Grobler: the problem does not consist in what to integrate with what 
but via what. We then get the following scheme of integration:
x is being integrated with y via integrator i
Therefore, the candidate we propose as integrator or integrative discipline 
is the general methodology of science. This role of methodology of science is 
different from the ones traditionally associated with it (descriptive method-
ology, normative methodology). It is about the already mentioned program-
ming role (“how it can be”), which was well expressed by Jerzy Kmita. What 
is important then is “to identify the kinds of potential connections that might 
be made by combining one’s own expert knowledge with other fields” [Priaulx, 
Weinel, 2018, p. 9; emphasis in original]. In this respect the project of pragmatic 
methodology by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, which was the basis of the Poznań 
Methodological School, remains valid. Pragmatic methodology deals not so 
much with the products of scholars’ activity but with science understood as 
profession of researchers, whose three main tasks are:
• analysis of types of activities carried out in research work;
• descriptions of research procedures;
• finding out the goals for which researchers in the various fields strive 
[Ajdukiewicz, 1974, p. 188].
In the analysis of integration projects, specialized methodology obviously plays 
the most important role but this does not mean that general methodology does 
not play any important role. It is visible for instance when we have “cognitive 
operations which occur in all disciplines, even though they may play different 
roles in different sciences” [Ibidem, p. 186; emphasis added].
Therefore, as we can see, such an understanding of integrator is coherent 
with the analysis of integration projects, where the problem of methodo-
logical deficit has been identified. This problem, however, does not concern 
insufficient advance when it comes to the pragmatic methodology but its 
omission. In this respect we have the possibility to “identify the lowest level 
of cognition about other fields” [Priaulx, Weinel, 2018, p. 12]. This level 
does not “yet” concern the explanation, which is a much higher level. On 
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the lowest level we have conceptualization problems with conceptualizing the 
units of analysis being the most basic of them [O’Malley et al., 2014, p. 823]. 
In this respect in particular cases of integration trials one should take into 
account local diversity of conceptualizations, parametrizations and thought 
styles. In a sense this task may seem to be elementary and rather unambitious. 
However, even if it lacks high-level abstractness, it does not mean it cannot 
take a sophisticated analytical form: “[l]ocal analyses are as large as they are 
made. If one can find a way to make connections between disparate events, 
one will have an extended analysis. (…) there is no theoretical limit to the 
size of the analytical network that one creates” [Stump, 1996, p. 285]. Our 
account on integration of sciences as a trinary relation, as elaborated in this 
paper, is an attempt to rethink the function of the general methodology of sci-
ence and humanities so it can play the role of integrator in integration trials.
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